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Democracies are declining worldwide. Lawmaking and judicial review
can help to stabilize democracies and protect fundamental rights. But these
safeguards can also be misused to facilitate democratic backsliding and
empower “legalistic autocrats” who deploy law to circumvent constitutional
restraints on their power. This Article compiles empirical data from more
than 140 countries to provide a framework for understanding how autocrats
repurpose national security law to consolidate power in weak democracies.
The Article demonstrates that policymakers worldwide enact amorphous
national security statutes. Meanwhile, courts cite deference to executive
authority and political questions as they abdicate their responsibilities for
judicial review of national security laws. Legalistic autocrats exploit this
statutory vagueness and judicial deference to undertake actions counter to
democratic principles. The convergence of autocratic politics, statutory
vagueness, and judicial deference fosters the emergence of a dangerous
liaison that can be described as dark law. In the shadow of consolidated state
enforcement powers, dark law allows autocratic leaders—operating under
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the guise of defending national security—to circumvent limitations on their
authority and selectively investigate, detain, prosecute, and imprison
disfavored groups.
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INTRODUCTION
Democracies are declining worldwide.1 Leaders in flagging democratic
states openly disparage norms and institutions that once shielded democratic
populations from autocratic rule.2 Legal scholars have described democracy’s

1

See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018)
(noting the rise in new forms of authoritarianism and the subversion of democratic norms);
DAVID RUNCIMAN, HOW DEMOCRACY ENDS (2018) (arguing the current crisis in democracy
is unlike those of the past and democracies may fail in different ways); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
CAN IT HAPPEN HERE? AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA (2018) (discussing potential threats
of authoritarianism in the U.S.); CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark A. Graber,
Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018) (documenting global forces and national
politics weakening constitutional democracies worldwide).
2
SANFORD LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION 2 (2019)
(summarizing theories of constitutional dysfunction and democratic loss under the Trump
Administration).
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waning as “recession,” 3 “breakdown,” 4 “retreat,” 5 “backsliding,” 6
“deconsolidation,” 7 “retrogression,” 8 “constitutional dismemberment,” 9 and
even “constitutional rot.” 10 Constitutional law and judicial review have the
potential to steady liberal republics and guard fundamental rights.11 But in times
of social uncertainty and political instability, political leaders can also weaponize
law to strike at constitutional protections.
Kim Lane Scheppele has previously shown how passing new laws
enables autocratic power in weak democracies. 12 State leaders, often elected
by voting publics, deploy law to dismantle liberal constitutions and
consolidate political authority. 13 Such “legalistic autocrats” effectively use
national security and emergency laws to erode constraints on their power and
roll back democratic accountability. 14
This Article builds on Scheppele’s insight that some autocrats
consolidate their enforcement powers under the cover of law.15 It uses original
3

Larry Diamond, Democracy in Decline: How Washington Can Reverse the Tide, 95
FOREIGN AFF. 151, 159 (2016).
4
Michael Pal, Breakdowns in the Democratic Process and the Law of Canadian Democracy,
57 MCGILL L. J. 299, 302 (2011).
5
JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE REVOLT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 10 (2013).
6
Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 5 (2016).
7
Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The Signs of Deconsolidation, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 5,
9–10 (2017).
8
Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV.
78, 96 (2018).
9
Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2
(2018).
10
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?: AUTHORITARIANISM IN
AMERICA 19, 19–20 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018).
11
Samuel Issacharoff, Judicial Review in Troubled Times: Stabilizing Democracy in a
Second-Best World, 98 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2019) (“Judicial review is one of many
mechanisms that remove from direct and immediate democratic accountability institutions
that may be predictability compromised in the press of political expediency.”).
12
Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 547 (2018) [hereinafter
Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism]; Kim Lane Scheppele, The Legal Complex and Lawyers-inChief, in THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE: STUDIES INSPIRED BY THE WORK
OF MALCOLM FEELEY 361, 363–64 (Rosann Greenspan, Hadar Aviram & Jonathan Simon eds.,
2019) (“[S]ometimes authoritarian leaders trained in law do exactly what one would guess with
law’s powerful potential. Such leaders can turn the neutral potential of legal ideas into illiberal
law, sometimes even pulling judges and other legal officials along with them.”).
13
Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, supra note 12, at 547 (“[D]emocracies are not just failing
for cultural or economic or political reasons. Some constitutional democracies are being
deliberately hijacked by a set of legally clever autocrats, who use constitutionalism and
democracy to destroy both.”).
14
Id. at 571.
15
Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocracy Under Cover of the Transnational Legal Order, in
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data and analyzes the content of national security laws worldwide. The Article
also describes for the first time how political leaders worldwide rely on statutory
vagueness in national security legislation and judicial deference in national
courts to circumvent constitutional constraints on leaders’ political power.
Previous legal scholars have argued persuasively that national
security laws broaden the scope of executive power, curtail civil liberties, and
ease paths to criminal prosecution for those suspected of national security
offenses.16 Yet for all the scholarly attention devoted to the costs of national
security, legal scholarship tends to downplay the global dimensions of
contemporary national security lawmaking. 17 Scholars have been disposed to
focus on threats of democratic collapse in particular countries rather than on
more incremental erosions of democratic liberalism worldwide.18 Constitutional
construction and national security policymaking often are analyzed in
isolation from transnational institutions and ideas.
This Article, in contrast, describes global shifts in national security
lawmaking. The research widens the aperture of previous case studies and
comparative investigations of national security law and contributes to an
emerging field of transnational legal studies by developing a relational approach
to national security.19 Building on theories in relational sociology, the Article
develops a new relationalist framework for studying national security
lawmaking as a process embedded in legislative-judicial-political relations.20
CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 188, 190 (Gregory Shaffer,
Tom Ginsburg & Terence C. Halliday eds., 2019).
16
See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND
LIBERTY 4 (2008) (“[T]errorism, one type of security threat, forces choices to be made that
may restrict civil liberties.”); Terence Taylor, United Kingdom, in COMBATING TERRORISM:
STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES 221 (Yonah Alexander ed., 2002) (describing an EU
counterterrorism measure that “[e]nabl[ed] law enforcement agencies to target and track
terrorists by requiring carriers to supply information about passengers and freight.”). See
generally COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE (Jenny Hocking &
Colleen Lewis eds., 2008) (describing national and international counter-terrorism measures
in the wake of the United States’ war on terror and their potential impacts on democracy).
17
For an exception to national and comparative legal approaches, see Kim Lane Scheppele, The
International Standardization of National Security Law, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 437, 437
(2010) (“But if nationally specific national security law seemed the norm before 9/11,
developments since seriously challenge that view, at least when it comes to fighting terrorism.”).
18
Bermeo, supra note 6, at 14.
19
For examples of transnational legal studies, see generally Kathryn Sikkink, THE JUSTICE
CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011);
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015);
Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 447
(2006); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal
Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); Gregory Shaffer, The New Legal Realist Approach
to International Law, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 189 (2015).
20
For an overview of relational sociology, see THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF RELATIONAL
SOCIOLOGY (François Dépelteau ed., 2018).
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The Article further advances the concept of dark law as an analytic
for understanding how processes of statutory construction, judicial review,
and politics converge in ways that undermine democratic norms and
institutions in weak democratic states. Based on content coding of national
security laws in 140 countries, the Article documents widespread statutory
vagueness in national security legislation. Lawmakers routinely draft
legislation with opaque language that is used to suspend ordinary substantive
and procedural standards. 21 This allows political leaders to circumvent
deeply rooted constitutional protections. Legalistic autocrats seek to evade
constitutional obstacles and consolidate their authority through novel
interpretations of amorphous statutory language.
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, it advances a processual and
relationalist approach to national security and develops the concept of dark
law. 22 Second, the Article discusses democracy’s decline and the global
transformation of national security. Third, the Article documents three
converging trends in global national security lawmaking: 1) the enactment of
vague legal provisions at the behest of state leaders; 2) the abdication of
judicial review in national security cases; and 3) the enforcement of illdefined national security laws by legalistic autocrats. The Article concludes
with a warning about the potential abuse of national security laws in weak
democratic states.
I. RELATIONALISM AND DARK LAW
As democracy wanes in many countries, legalistic autocrats have
relied on vague legal provisions and weak judicial review to circumvent
constitutional limits on their authority. Existing critiques of national security
laws in weak democracies have rightfully drawn attention to the curtailment
of civil liberties and the expansion of policing powers. 23 However, global
21

DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 2–
3 (2006); see also Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The ‘War on Terror’ and Extremism: Assessing the
Relevance of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, 92 INT’L AFF. 275, 281 (2016) (“The
new measures have enabled democratic states to make use of emergency powers by invoking
human rights regimes, and to do so with less justification or excuse than would previously
have been deemed necessary.”).
22
Dark law does not reference actual darkness or lightness but rather processes by which
vague statutes and weak judicial review undermine legal transparency and democracy. Dark
law describes historically contingent webs of legislative-judicial-political relations that
obscure unconstitutional or undemocratic state action.
23
See generally COURTS AND TERRORISM: NINE NATIONS BALANCE RIGHTS AND SECURITY
(Mary L. Volcansek & John F. Stack Jr. eds., 2011) (examining contemporary judicial
responses to national security laws in nine countries); COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES
OF TEN COUNTRIES, supra note 16 (providing an assessment of ten national counterterrorism
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changes in relations between lawmaking, judicial review, and politics have
received less scrutiny. By triangulating data on statutory vagueness, judicial
deference, and autocratic rule, this Article advances a relationalist framework
for understanding the global transformation of national security lawmaking.
This relational approach to national security develops a conception of dark
law—not as a particular kind of law, but as a set of legislative-judicialpolitical relations that erode constitutional protections and empower
legalistic autocrats.
Legal scholars tend to think about law as either substance or
procedure. It follows that most legal analyses focus on discrete principles or
procedural standards. However, this Article rejects the study of law extricated
from relational processes and contexts.24 Building on insights from relational
sociology, the Article envisions the study of law as an empirical investigation
of relational interactions between agents and institutions that generate useful
insights about social worlds. Such relationalism resists reification of social
objects—such as national security law or democracy—and raises awareness
about the inescapable interdependency of social agents—including
lawmakers, judges, and politicians. 25
As an intellectual movement relational sociology has gained influence
in recent decades and developed several distinct approaches to social analysis.
These include a pragmatist approach inspired by John Dewey and American
Pragmatism, a structuralist approach influenced by George Simmel, and a
power-conflict approach that builds on the work of Norbert Elias and Pierre
Bourdieu. 26 This Article draws primarily on Dewey’s pragmatic
transactionalism and Bourdieu’s reflexivity and methodological relationalism.
Four ontological pillars undergird a relational approach to legal
analysis. These ontologies are dynamic and subject to change, but orient
relationalist scholarship and reveal tendencies in relational thinking. First,
strategies post-9/11); COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE, supra note
16 (describing national and international counter-terrorism measures in the wake of the
United States war on terror and their potential impacts on democracy).
24
For more background on relational sociology, see generally THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK
OF RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 20; Mustafa Emirbayer, Manifesto for a Relational
Sociology, 103 AM. J. SOCIO. 281 (1997) [hereinafter Emirbayer, Manifesto]; Ann Mische,
Relational Sociology, Culture, and Agency, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL NETWORK
ANALYSIS 80 (John Scott & Peter J. Carrington eds., 2011); Mustafa Emirbayer, Relational
Sociology as Fighting Words, in CONCEPTUALIZING RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY:
ONTOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 209 (Christopher Powell & François Dépelteau
eds., 2013).
25
François Dépelteau, Relational Sociology, Pragmatism, Transactions, and Social Fields,
25 INT’L REV. SOCIO. 45, 52–53 (2015).
26
See François Dépelteau, Relational Thinking in Sociology: Relevance, Concurrence and
Dissonance, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF RELATIONAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 20, at
25–26 (discussing “three major sub-currents within [relational sociology]”: pragmatism,
structuralism, and “[t]he study of power relations, inequalities and conflicts”).
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law exists only through social interactions. Law is not an independent thing,
substance, or social fact. Legal reasoning, legal decision-making, and legal
writing are profoundly interdependent upon social interactions in particular
legal fields.27 Lawyers, statutes, and judges do not and cannot exist outside
of particular sets of relations. 28 And because there is no law beyond social
relations, the study of law requires relational inquiry and empirical
investigation of social interactions.
Second, law is not a reflection of objective principles and doctrine. A
relational approach rejects modernist dualisms, including dualisms of
knowledge and practice, reason and action, and objectivity and subjectivity.
Relational legal analysis has the capacity to undermine dualistic distinctions
and to study interactions between various processes and legal participants as
a means to understand their mutual constitution. Relationalism recognizes
that legal relations, and the social prejudice embedded within them, cannot
be divorced from reasoning minds. The construction of law cannot be
disentangled from everyday social relations and the habitualized actions of
legal agents in specific legal fields. Law unfolds through the transactions of
legal players as they navigate specific environments. Law is not something
fixed beyond individuals; it is something people do together, participate in,
and reproduce through their social actions.
Third, law is historically contingent. Statutory construction, for
example, depends on dynamic policymaking processes that emerge from
historical relations, which are themselves social processes. Legal definitions
and procedures—from definitions of deviance to standards of due process—
are produced in particular social contexts that condition intersubjective
understandings of law. To engage in legal analysis, therefore, is also to
engage in historicity. Relational legal scholars must historicize legal agents
and institutions.
Finally, a relational approach to law also demands a degree of
reflexivity about objects of investigation.29 The very meaning and significance
of law derives from its reference to a set of juridical relations in specified
contexts. 30 Therefore, the content of law should not be presumed or

Richard Terdiman, Translator’s Introduction, in Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law:
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 806–07 (1987).
28
Law and legal identities are realized only through social practice. A lawyer becomes a
lawyer through interactions with clients and other legal agents. A judge becomes a judge
through adjudicative action in relations with other legal participants.
29
PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY
100 (1992).
30
Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 814, 816 (1987).
27
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preconstructed. 31 Legal scholars must interrogate their own assumptions
about subjects of investigation and relations that constitute social objects, and
also grapple with the ways that their identities and social locations impact
their analytic categories.32
The need for reflexivity, however, should not be interpreted as an
unequivocal embrace of contextualism that belies efforts to develop more
general frameworks or theories to understand lawmaking. A relational
approach recognizes that law is continuously made and remade, moment by
moment, relation by relation. 33 Law is in a constant state of becoming.
However, law’s ongoing transformation and adaptation to new situations
produces novel logics of practice and social patterns that can be classified
and theorized in an effort to address future social problems. The global
transformation of national security lawmaking, for example, creates novel
opportunities for political mobilization and presents opportunities for state
leaders to exercise law differently. State officials have curtailed civil liberties,
authorized administrative detention, and rolled back due process protections
in criminal prosecutions. 34 These new logics in national security lawmaking
also produce gaps in the law that sanction previously forbidden state action. 35
Relational approaches to legal analysis help to reveal the social consequences
of lawmaking by moving away from textualism and towards the study of
social processes, transactions, and institutions. At times, this requires the
development of new relational concepts, such as dark law.
A. Dark Law
Dark law describes a paradoxical process in which autocratic leaders
rely on vague statutory language and judicial passivity to engage in state
action counter to the rule of law. It is a relational term that describes processes
by which national security policymaking, judicial review, and autocratic
politics converge. The study of dark law, therefore, requires methodological
relationalism—legal analysis centered on relations and transactions rather
than on substantive legal standards or procedural rules.
See PIERRE BOURDIEU, PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS 106 (2000) (“[Social sciences can]
undertake to understand and explain their own genesis and, more generally, the genesis of
scholastic fields, in other words the processes of emergence (or autonomization) from which they
arose, as well as the genesis of the dispositions that were invented as the fields were constituted
and which slowly install themselves in bodies in the course of the learning process.”).
32
BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 29, at 160.
33
Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 869, 879–80 (1988).
34
DONOHUE, supra note 16, at 4.
35
See, e.g., Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
1, 2 (2004) (“Even in modern times terrible injustices have been perpetrated in the name of
security on thousands who had no effective recourse to law. Too often courts of law have
denied the writ of the rule of law with only the most perfunctory examination.”)
31
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Dark law is not a type of law in the traditional sense. It is not a subset of
national security law or criminal law. In fact, it is not a kind of law at all but
rather a set of relations and processes that constitute lawmaking in weak
democracies. Conceptually, dark law describes particular configurations of
legislative-judicial-political relations that empower autocrats to clandestinely
transform legal language into political power. It is a pernicious outgrowth of
vague statutory construction, deferential judicial review, and political
opportunism. Authorities brandish national security law as a response to
constructed security threats in order to circumvent legal restraints on their power.
National security law consists of relationships and interactions in
courts and political contexts. Legislatures enact security statutes, judges
interpret them, and police and prosecutors enforce them at particular
moments and in particular jurisdictions. Relations between legal agents
determine the meanings and consequences of national security lawmaking
and enforcement. While legal scholars will acknowledge that substantive law
is not simply anterior to procedure, legal analyses still trend towards
substantialism—the idea that rigid legal content underlies experiences of law.
Methodological relationalism and the concept of dark law challenge this
substantialism and urge more empirically grounded relational analysis.
The primary aim of developing dark law to understand national
security is to move beyond conceptions of national security legislation as a
substantive kind of law and towards a recognition of national security
lawmaking as an unfolding series of historicized relationships and
intersections with processes of judicial review and political action. 36 The
concept of dark law illuminates new logics of lawmaking, judicial
interpretation, and politics that pool state power to undermine democracy. 37
National security lawmaking is conceived as processes, interactions, and
relationships rather than substantive statutes and rules. National security law
inevitably operates through overlapping legislative, judicial, and political
fields, which are empirically interrelated and mutually determinative, but also
change over time. Relationalist legal scholars, therefore, should endeavor to
identify various kinds of relationships in lawmaking that produce new
opportunities for problem-solving. Vague statutory construction, judicial
deference, and autocratic rule produce a particular pathology that aids
legalistic autocrats in the consolidation of political power. The recognition of
these processes aids in developing defenses against autocratic legalism and
countering undemocratic effects.
36

See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (1990) (providing a critique of
scholastic reason divorced from practical logics and a model for scientific practice).
37
For more on pooling powers, see Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
211, 213 (2015) (“Pooling blends the legal authorities that different agencies derive from
distinct statutory schemes. And it enables the executive to combine one agency’s expertise
with legal authority allocated to another.”).
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Dark law as an analytic category has three defining features. First,
dark law is a series of relationships and exists as an extension of other social
processes, including statutory construction, judicial interpretation, and
autocratic politics. National security scholars who study jurisprudence and
formal statutory law gain valuable insights into curtailment of substantive
rights and procedural protections. However, this approach to legal analysis
risks myopia to logics, practices, and processes that fundamentally determine
law’s effects in particular countries and communities. Formal law functions
very differently in different places and at different times, and the study of law
in isolation from social and institutional relations can discount disparities in
legal effects. By adopting a relational approach to legal analysis, legal
scholars can better understand practical impacts of national security
lawmaking on democracy and constitutional rights. 38 Such relationalism
endeavors to sidestep what John Dewey called “fixations”—ends and values
extracted from social relations.39
Second, dark law should be understood as a complex of legislativejuridical-political relations which exists in social fields that are bounded both
temporally and geographically. The concept of fields is a useful way to locate
relations between people and institutions. 40 Fields are social spaces of
objective relations that constitute a social environment and condition actors’
practices and struggles. 41 Fields emerge from historical processes and
gradually gain autonomy from other systems of relations. 42 As the internal
apparatus of a field develops, it cultivates an autonomous bounded space
capable of socializing participants into a set of rules and constraints and
reproducing a specific symbolic system. 43 The field therefore may be thought
of as both a positional structure that reproduces social hierarchies and a
symbolic structure that defines a particular logic of practice against
competing logics of practice in society. Fields may exhibit similar
characteristics, or homologies, to other fields even as they remain bounded
spaces.44 However, fields still remain semi-autonomous sites of social and
38

The focus on process and relations is a common feature of Bourdieusian and relational
sociology. See generally Emirbayer, Manifesto, supra note 24 (exploring the features of a
dynamic and continuous social reality).
39
John Dewey, Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us, in THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE
COMMON MAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN DEWEY TO CELEBRATE HIS EIGHTIETH
BIRTHDAY 220, 227 (1940) (“All ends and values that are cut off from the ongoing process
become arrests, fixations. They strive to fixate what has been gained instead of using it to
open the road and point the way to new and better experiences.”).
40
Daniel N. Kluttz & Neil Fligstein, Varieties of Sociological Field Theory, in HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 185, 186 (Seth Abrutyn ed., 2016).
41
BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 29, at 97.
42
John Levi Martin, What is Field Theory?, 109 AM. J. SOCIO. 1, 26–28.
43
NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS 3–4 (2012).
44
BOURDIEU & WACQUANT, supra note 29, at 100.
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political struggle that insulate and inculcate, animate and discipline, motivate
and constrain. The concept of fields orients empirical researchers to historical
forces and institutional dynamics and draws attention to the particular
resources—social, cultural, and material—used by actors in those
environments to achieve their goals.
Finally, methods for understanding dark law as a set of relations in
specific fields should be grounded in empiricism and, whenever possible, rely
on evidence triangulated from various sources. The reorientation of legal
analysis to relationships in specific social fields calls for more data and
investigation. Relational approaches to the study of law move beyond
ordinary language to gather information from those people and institutions
most affected by legal rules and enforcement. Dark law provides a
relationalist framework for the study of national security lawmaking in weak
democracies, which should prove useful to researchers seeking to historicize
dynamic relationships between statutory construction, judicial review, and
legalistic autocrats.
II. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE AND THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION OF
NATIONAL SECURITY
After the Cold War, a broad coalition of liberal states promoted open
economies and greater multilateral cooperation. Lawmakers revised
constitutions and democratic institutions proliferated.45 Many legal reforms
promoted democratic principles, such as fair elections and basic human
rights. 46 With this global diffusion of democratic norms and the
corresponding growth of democratic institution, democracy’s progressive
triumph appeared secure. Every year between 1975 and 2007, the number of
democracies worldwide either held steady or multiplied. 47
However, this floodtide of democratic reform began to ebb in the last
decade.48 Mounting evidence now shows democracy in retreat. 49 Every year
45

Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Michael D. Ward, Diffusion and the Spread of Democratic
Institutions, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 261-302 (Beth A.
Simmons, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett eds., 2008); Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons &
Geoffrey Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion,
Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 449, 450 (2007).
46
Larry Diamond & Mark F. Plattner, Introduction, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF
DEMOCRACY xxi–xxiv (Larry Diamond & Mark F. Plattner eds., 1996)
47
Larry Diamond, Facing Up to the Democratic Recession, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 141, 141 (2015).
48
KURLANTZICK, supra note 5, at 5–7.
49
See YASCHA MOUNK, THE PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRACY: WHY OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER
AND HOW TO SAVE IT 2–3 (2018) (discussing the rise of populism and decline of democracy
in countries like the United States, Russia, Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, and predicting that
“[m]ore countries may soon follow”); DAVID RUNCIMAN, HOW DEMOCRACY ENDS 7–9
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since 2007, more countries have experienced decreases in freedom. 50
Democracy even appears under threat in former stalwarts of the liberal order.
From Brexit in the United Kingdom to the rise of populism in Europe to
growing white nationalism in the United States, norms and institutions in
bedrock democracies have come under fire in recent years. Political scientists
and legal scholars are still somewhat divided on whether democratization has
stalled in recent years or whether these changes indicate a historic decline. 51
But there is an emerging consensus on the crises of public confidence in
democratic governance.52 Data shows, for example, that millennials in many
well-established constitutional democracies now express weaker approval for
democratic values. 53 Recent trends also suggest a major shift in people’s
faithfulness to democratic norms. 54 On a global scale, failed democratic
experiments in Iraq and Afghanistan, uneven transitions after the Arab Spring
in many Middle Eastern countries, and military coups and electoral fraud
have dampened democratic enthusiasm in transitional states. 55 A growing
number of hybrid democratic regimes also seem to be backsliding, including
Venezuela, Turkey, Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines. 56 Meanwhile,
shifting global politics have emboldened leaders in non-democracies,
including China and Russia.
(2018) (imagining a gradual decline of democracy by exploring potential risks of coup,
catastrophe, or technological takeover).
50
Larry Diamond, Democracy Demotion: How the Freedom Agenda Fell Apart, 98 FOREIGN
AFF. 17, 17 (2019).
51
See generally Anna Lührmann & Staffan I. Lindberg, A Third Wave of Autocratization Is
Here: What Is New About It?, 26 DEMOCRATIZATION 1095 (2019) (providing a summary of
autocratization events through the twentieth century to show a decline in democracy); ROGER
EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN, NATIONAL POPULISM: THE REVOLT AGAINST LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (2018) (tracing the cause of the rise of anti-politics movements to distrust of
government, destruction of communal identity, increasing economic inequality, and changes
in the relationship between identity and political brands).
52
MOUNK, supra note 49, at 3.
53
See, e.g., Foa & Mounk, supra note 7, at 5 (“American citizens are not just dissatisfied
with the performance of particular governments; they are increasingly critical of liberal
democracy itself. Among young Americans polled in 2011, for example, a record high of 24
percent stated that democracy is a ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ way of running the country—a sharp
increase both from prior polls and compared to older respondents.”)
54
Larry Diamond, Breaking Out of the Democratic Slump, 31 J. DEMOCRACY 36, 37–38 (2020).
55
See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 47, at 144 (“Since 2000, I count 25 breakdowns of
democracy in the world—not only through blatant military or executive coups, but also
through subtle and incremental degradations of democratic rights and procedures that finally
push a democratic system over the threshold into competitive authoritarianism.”).
56
Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal
Constitutionalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 241 (2018) (“Across a range of different
geopolitical contexts, an increasing number of countries can appropriately be characterized
as ‘hybrid’ democracies, such as competitive authoritarian regimes and
‘democratorship[s].’”).
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Contemporaneous with democracy’s decline, disenchanted publics
are voting for autocratic leaders as alternatives to traditional political party
leaders.57 Although such leaders may struggle to consolidate political control,
their ascent signals a dangerous illiberal trend, particularly in countries where
new leaders deploy law to subvert democratic institutions. 58 The Law and
Justice government in Poland, for example, has challenged the legitimacy and
autonomy of the country’s constitutional court and also used Polish law to
target civil society organizations and opposition groups. 59 According to a
2019 Freedom House Report:
Of the 23 countries that suffered a negative status change over
the past 13 years (moving from Free to Partly Free, or Partly
Free to Not Free), almost two-thirds (61 percent) had earned
a positive status change after 1988. For example, Hungary,
which became Free in 1990, fell back to Partly Free this year
after five consecutive years of decline and 13 years without
improvement.60
While reasons for such declines are manifold, democratic publics worldwide
appear more open to autocratic forms of leadership, and evidence suggests a
willingness on the part of autocrats to exploit law and judicial deference to
achieve both personal and political ends.
The global transformation of national security began decades before
9/11 or the rise of legalistic autocrats.61 In the 1980s and 1990s, for example,
numerous countries enacted counterterrorism measures with vague statutory
57

See generally Arch Puddington & Tyler Roylance, The Freedom House Survey for 2016:
The Dual Threat of Populists and Autocrats, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 105 (2017) (describing an
increase in the popularity of populist and nationalist politics); Sergei Guriev & Daniel
Treisman, Informational Autocrats, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 100 (2019) (assessing the impact of
a twenty-first century trend away from brutal dictatorship and toward nonideological
autocrats who are elected but consequently dismantle democratic institutions).
58
See Guillermo A. O’Donnell, The Perpetual Crises of Democracy, 18 J. DEMOCRACY 5
(2007) (describing an increasing trend of authoritarian rulers using democratic institutions
like free elections to legitimize their control).
59
Kriszta Kovács & Kim Lane Scheppele, The Fragility of an Independent Judiciary:
Lessons from Hungary and Poland—and the European Union, 51 COMMUNIST & POSTCOMMUNIST STUD. 189, 194–98 (2018).
60
Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat [https://perma.cc/
MT9K-8ZYM] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021); see also Sarah Repucci, The Freedom House
Survey for 2019: The Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, 31 J. DEMOCRACY 137, 137 (2020)
(stating that “Freedom House found that 2019 was the fourteenth consecutive year of decline
in global freedom,” caused in part by leaders’ willingness to disregard institutional
safeguards and the rights of minority groups).
61
See Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International”
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1361 (2018) (describing how legal divides in
approaches to terrorism emerged from a range of legal authorities and predated 9/11).
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definitions. 62 However, 9/11 accelerated changes in national security
policymaking worldwide. Lawmakers increasingly drafted expansive
legislation aimed at nebulous security threats. The war on terror gave national
policymakers permission to target a broad range of events and actions—from
intensifying border security to expanding domestic surveillance to increasing
regulation of global financial networks.
Democracy’s decline breathed new life into many of the national
security laws enacted in the shadow of 9/11. 63 In the decade after the 9/11
attacks, most countries in the world passed new laws to address potential
threats of terrorism.64 Even small island nations with no history of terrorism
enacted expansive new counterterrorism legislation. 65 Consequences of the
transformation have been far-reaching, particularly for weak or hybrid
democratic states. New laws were decoupled from considerations of violence
in some countries. They became less rooted in security realities and more
dependent on party officials and political rhetoric. Revised national
emergency acts and counterterrorism laws, for example, empowered
executives to unilaterally declare national crises and unlocked an array of
powers.66 Under new legislation, leaders could freeze financial assets of those
suspected of criminal violations, mobilize military and national guards,
restrict travel, and institute forms of martial law. 67
62

See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (2006) (surveying the evolution of
foreign and domestic terrorism in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries).
63
WILHELM MIROW, STRATEGIC CULTURE, SECURITISATION AND THE USE OF FORCE: POST9/11 SECURITY PRACTICES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 3–4 (2016).
64
See Scheppele, supra note 17, at 442 (“Member states overwhelmingly applauded these
efforts – and rapid changes in domestic anti-terror laws followed around the world. While
international law famously has compliance problems, such problems seemed to disappear
here. All 192 U.N. member states filed at least one report with the Security Council's
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), a subsidiary body that was created to monitor and
enforce compliance with Resolution 1373.”).
65
See generally Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta (Chair of the U.N. Security Council CounterTerrorism Committee), Global Survey of the Implementation of Security Council Resolution
1624 (2005) by Member States, U.N. Doc S/2016/50, annex (Jan. 18, 2016) (providing a
survey of counterterrorism measures enacted by UN Member States).
66
Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal Agency
Emergency Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3339, 3373 (2013) (“Many state emergency
statutes do not expressly provide whether the initial, agency emergency determination is
judicially reviewable.”).
67
J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order, 129 YALE
L.J. 1020, 1024 (2020) (“[T]he concept of national security has transformed from its
relatively stable Cold War meaning anchored in the context of interstate conflict. Today,
national security has evolved to address a range of threats, including nonstate actors and
nonmilitary and nonhuman threats, such as economic crises, cybersecurity, infectious
disease, climate change, transnational crime, and corruption, which are often unmoored from
interstate rivalries. These developments give rise to the ‘new’ national security: a growing

Vol. 6:4]

Dark Law

657

Changes to counterterrorism legislation provide a salient example of
this global transformation of national security. Within three weeks of the 9/11
attacks, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 1373,
which required all UN member states to adopt new national measures to
combat terrorism. 68 The resolution promoted domestic criminalization of
terrorist offenses, mandated counterterrorism reporting, and developed strict
regulation of fundraising activities for suspected terrorism-related
organizations.69 Within two months, United States President George W. Bush
signed the expansive USA PATRIOT Act into law, which authorized an array
of state surveillance and border security measures.70 Less than a decade later,
more than 142 countries worldwide had enacted or revised their
counterterrorism laws.71
Global counterterrorism legislation had national effects too. Laws
expanded state authority to detain and prosecute a range of people suspected
of terrorism-related offenses by minimizing judicial oversight of
investigations and restricting suspects access to legal counsel. 72 In most
countries, for example, new legislation heightened screening procedures for
those entering the country, expanded domestic surveillance, increased the
ability of state officials to track and freeze financial assets, and narrowed the
scope of judicial review in terrorism prosecutions. 73 Some countries,
including the United States, also created special military courts or sanctioned
the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists. 74 Even the COVID-19

collection of security practices agnostic to the source or nature of a threat, unbounded by
time and space, and decentered from any overriding great-power or interstate conflict.”).
68
S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
69
Id.
70
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 34, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
71
Data compiled by the author in partnership with the Program on Terrorism and
Counterterrorism at Human Rights Watch.
72
In the Name of Security: Counterterrorism Laws Worldwide Since September 11, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (June 29, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/29/name-security/counter
terrorism-laws-worldwide-september-11 [https://perma.cc/FCX6-W3EX].
73
See generally COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGIES OF TEN COUNTRIES, supra note 16
(providing an assessment of ten national counterterrorism strategies post-9/11); COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE, supra note 16 (describing national and
international counter-terrorism measures in the wake of the United States war on terror and
their potential impacts on democracy); GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (Victor
V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach eds., 2005) (providing a summary of domestic and
international responses to terrorism in the twenty-first century).
74
See generally GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND MILITARY
COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Oren Gross eds.,
2013) (describing the creation of military courts as a mechanism to prosecute people
suspected of terrorism-related offenses).
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pandemic has brought increased attention to the need for robust national
security and emergencies laws.75
The global transformation of national security has not been restricted
to a specific kind of political regime. Both democracies and authoritarian
states rewrote penal codes, enacted more stringent immigration statutes, and
passed financial regulations that provided authorities greater capacity to
monitor and halt financial transactions. 76 Even countries with minimal
histories of political violence embraced wide ranging procedural and
substantive legal reforms.
However, new national security laws did not universally restrict civil
liberties. Some nations—including Canada, Switzerland, and Scandinavian
countries—were able to pass laws without curtailing liberties.77 The impact
of counterterrorism laws and restrictions on domestic legal rights varied by
the type of political regime. 78 In states with moderate levels of repression, for
example, new laws had harmful effects on civil liberties. 79 But these effects
diminished in less repressive countries.80 This evidence suggests democratic
institutions may help to protect residents from violations of substantive and
due process rights even where national lawmakers introduce expansive
national security reforms. Law’s impact depends on political and juridical
relations in specific countries.
National security lawmaking also appears to have decoupled from
political violence in many countries. According to Global Terrorism Database
(GTD), incidents of terrorism that resulted in fifteen or more casualties peaked
in the 1980s. 81 Fewer terrorist attacks occurred in the early 2000s. 82
75

See, e.g., Benjamin Della Rocca, Samantha Fry, Masha Simonova & Jacques SingerEmery, State Emergency Authorities to Address COVID-19, LAWFARE (May 4, 2020, 3:03 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/state-emergency-authorities-address-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/
7XAQ-YJU7] (summarizing emergency orders that states may use in response to COVID
emergency).
76
See generally GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, supra note 73 (summarizing
the legal solutions employed by nations seeking to increase counterterrorism measures);
NATIONAL INSECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEMOCRACIES DEBATE COUNTERTERRORISM
(Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds., 2007) (identifying best practices for enacting legal
counterterrorism measures while also protecting human rights).
77
Mariaelisa Epifanio, Legislative Response to International Terrorism, 48 J. PEACE RSCH.
399, 403 (2011).
78
Eran Shor, Leonardo Baccini, Chi-Ting Tsai, Tai-Ho Lin & Titus C. Chen,
Counterterrorist Legislation and Respect for Civil Liberties: An Inevitable Collision?, 41
STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 339, 352 (2018).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Global Terrorism Database: Information on More than 200,000 Terrorist Attacks, START,
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ [https://perma.cc/ EQF6-DQSM] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
82
Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism, 38
CRIME AND JUST. 413, 458 (2009).
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In fact, incidents of terrorism declined globally between 1992 and 2004. 83
While terrorism incidents fluctuate per year, global trends in terrorism
violence do not correlate with patterns of legal reform between 1970–2011.84
Although public concerns about national security increased after 9/11,
empirical data suggests that most legislative reforms happened independent
of incidents of political violence. 85 Neither the number of terrorist events nor
the number of civilians killed significantly correlates with the enactment of
new counterterrorism laws, with one exception: there was a higher likelihood
that a law would be passed immediately following an attack that killed more
than ten civilians.86 Therefore, while counterterrorism lawmakers appear to
take advantage of policy windows after deadly attacks, most legislative action
on national security is not responsive to levels of political violence. Crossnational data on counterterrorism laws from years 1981 and 2009 also show
no direct relationship between new laws and a reduction of terrorist
violence.87 Global national security lawmaking has become more responsive
to politics than to violence. 88 This global transformation of national security
lawmaking has created novel opportunities for legalistic autocrats to
consolidate their power.
III. TRENDS IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAWMAKING WORLDWIDE
Three trends have accompanied global decoupling of national
security lawmaking from political violence. First, national security laws have
incorporated vague statutory language. Second, courts have abdicated their
responsibility for judicial review of new national security legislation, often
citing political questions or deference to executive power in the realm of
national security. And third, legalistic autocrats have used new national
83

Eran Shor, The Spatial Diffusion of Counterterrorist Legislation, 1970-2011, 64 SOC.
PROBS. 106, 106–07 (2016).
84
Id. at 123.
85
Id. at 118.
86
Id. (“The log of each event with at least ten casualties increases the odds of legislation by
about 4 percent. The effect further increases following attacks in which more than 100
civilians had died, with the odds for legislation growing by about 10 percent.”)
87
Eran Shor, Counterterrorist Legislation and Subsequent Terrorism: Does it Work?, 95
SOC. FORCES 525, 529 (2016) (“[C]ounterterrorist legislation may often be no more than an
empty declaration, designed to send the message that the state is indeed doing something to
fight terrorist threats.”)
88
See Elena Pokalova, Legislative Responses to Terrorism: What Drives States to Adopt New
Counterterrorism Legislation?, 27 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 474, 475 (2015) (“[B]efore
September 11 the decision to adopt new counterterrorism legislation correlated with the
number of terrorist organizations operating in the territory of a state. . . . After September 11,
however, . . . the only significant predictors of the decision to adopt new counterterrorism
legislation turned out to be the presence of previous counterterrorism legislation and the
participation of a state in the War on Terror.”)
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security laws to consolidate their power and circumvent constitutional
restraints on their actions.
A. Vagueness
Vagueness surfaces when lawmakers fail to describe legal concepts
with precise statutory language.89 It is perhaps the most pernicious form of
linguistic indeterminacy. 90 While some vagueness is inevitable in statutory
construction, excessively vague statutes invite faulty interpretations and abuse.
For these reasons, judges are typically empowered to narrowly interpret and
clarify legal language that does not provide the public with adequate notice of
its provisions, or, under void-for-vagueness doctrine, strike down statutes that
improperly delegate interpretive authority to law enforcement.91
Judges often rely on the ordinary meanings of language in legislation
and escape vagueness problems. 92 Courts routinely refuse to consider
evidence beyond what judges believe to be the text’s plain or ordinary
meaning. 93 Nevertheless, problems associated with vagueness can occur,
even with well-drafted legislation.94
Courts generally oppose vagueness on two grounds. First, vague
statutes provide insufficient notice to publics about the kinds of conduct
regulated under the law.95 If language in national security legislation is overly
vague, citizens may not be able to decipher which acts are illegal and could
accidently commit national security offenses. 96 Additionally, if publics do
not understand which actions are illegal, they may avoid all actions that could
89

Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF.
L. REV. 509, 516 (1994) (“[P]roblems of vagueness will arise whenever we confront a
continuum with terminology that has, or aspires to have, a bivalent logic.”).
90
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 32–33 (2012) (explaining that vagueness is often intentional).
91
Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited,
30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 294–95 (2020).
92
See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (using ordinary
meaning to discern legislative purpose behind a preemption statute).
93
See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2412 (2018) (“Given the clarity of the text,
we need not consider such extra-textual evidence.”).
94
See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1138–39
(2017) (noting that while individual pieces of legislation may be well-drafted and clear, their
overlap allows prosecutors to “choose from a large ‘menu’ of criminal charges” and exert
undue discretion).
95
See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974) (“[T]he court found that the language
failed to provide adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guidelines for law
enforcement officials, and set juries and courts at large.”).
96
See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Ordinary
connotation does not always prevail, but the more unnatural the proposed interpretation of a
law, the more compelling the contextual evidence must be to show that it is correct.”).
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be construed as illegal under the vague statute. 97 This also has negative
effects on the public because it may stifle legal conduct or generate
trepidation among lawful citizens.
Vagueness concerns related to notice can be resolved with recourse
to the statutory rule of lenity, which allows judges to resolve vagueness
problems in favor of defendants. 98 However, in the context of national
security offenses, courts may place less reliance on the rule of lenity or other
defendant-friendly procedural protections. 99
The second reason that courts generally oppose vagueness is a lack of
clear standards for enforcement. Vague statutory language gives wide
discretion to law enforcement to investigate and detain individuals who they
suspect of national security offenses. This discretion risks arbitrary or
discriminatory conduct by police, prosecutors, or juries who may interpret
legal provisions based on personal suspicions or bias. Further, vagueness can
also blur lines of authority and raise questions about the proper standards for
judicial review.100
There is no single approach to statutory vagueness. 101 But, in contrast
to statutory ambiguity, which involves divergent meanings generally
distinguishable in context, vagueness provides extensive latitude to legalistic
autocrats who seek to employ laws for unintended ends. Therefore, judicial
deference to vagueness can present serious problems for checks on legalistic
autocrats in weak democracies, where courts can be exceptionally deferential
to executive authorities.
Statutory vagueness is common in national security legislation.
Lawmakers worldwide enacted a range of laws as part of the war against
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015) (“Our cases establish that the
Government violates [due process] by taking away someone’s life, liberty, or property under
a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it
punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”).
98
See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (“[T]he canon of strict
construction of criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning by so resolving
ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered.”); State v. Pena,
683 P.2d 744, 748–49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d, 683 P.2d 743 (Ariz. 1984) (“[W]here the
statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity dictates that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”).
99
See WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
FEDERAL TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 1 (2015) (noting “a disturbing incursion on the
procedural and substantive rights” generally afforded criminal defendants, “often in the name
of national security”).
100
See Goldsmith, supra note 91, at 284–86 (discussing rationales underpinning the void-forvagueness doctrine, including threats to separation of powers and standards of judicial review).
101
Lawrence M. Solan, Why It Is So Difficult to Resolve Vagueness in Legal Interpretation,
in VAGUENESS AND LAW 231, 234 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (“[T]here really is
no single approach to vagueness that transcends the situation, so even the most committed
formalist will be forced to shift from one approach to another.”).
97
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terrorism that expanded law enforcement powers and eased paths to
prosecution for people suspected of national security offenses. In some cases,
lawmakers likely intended to enact vague statutory language. But vagueness
was also a byproduct of legislative hastiness and public pressure to overcriminalize activities connected with terrorism.
National security vagueness problems also reveal inconsistencies in
how lawmakers define national security. For example, even after a century of
multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism, there is no international
definition of terrorism.102 For years, UN officials labored without success to
build consensus on what constitutes terrorism. 103 Informed by sixteen
international legal instruments on terrorism, working definitions
continuously circulated through UN committees and other international
bodies, but produced no general definition. This failure to reach agreement
partly reflects opportunities for strategic indeterminacy in national security
laws. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for example, Resolution 1373
mandates cooperation among all member states in combating terrorism, but
provides no binding definition of terrorism. 104 States can decipher for
themselves what acts of political violence rise to the level of terrorism, and
political leaders can use variation in definitions across national security laws
to bypass constitutional constraints on their authority.105
Content coding of national counterterrorism laws worldwide shows
frequent vagueness problems in terrorism definitions. 106 Lawmakers in
eighty-eight countries, for example, define terrorism as acts that threaten
“public order,” but these lawmakers rarely provide guidelines for interpreting
the meaning of public order or enumerate specific threats to public order. As
102

See Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept
in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B. C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 23, 24 (2006) (“Notwithstanding the great concern about terrorism, it is
most often said that no universally (or even widely) accepted definition of terrorism exists at
international law.”).
103
Jane Boulden & Thomas G. Weiss, Whither Terrorism and the United Nations?, in
TERRORISM AND THE UN: BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 3, 4 (Jane Boulden &
Thomas G. Weiss eds., 2004).
104
S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
105
For an exploration of the undefined nature of the term “terrorism,” see generally Donald
Black, The Geometry of Terrorism, 22 SOCIO. THEORY 14 (2004); Charles Tilly, Terror,
Terrorism, Terrorists, 22 SOCIO. THEORY 5 (2004); LISA STAMPNITZKY, DISCIPLINING
TERROR: HOW EXPERTS INVENTED “TERRORISM” (2013).
106
In order to assess the substantive content of the counterterrorism laws, the author coded
legislative texts of the archived counterterrorism laws with a focus on seven categories.
Countries were the primary unit of analysis for the content coding. The seven categories
included: 1) Definitions of terrorism; 2) Definitions of terrorist organizations; 3) Prohibitions
on material support for terrorism; 4) Limitations on speech that incites, legitimates, or lends
support to terrorism; 5) Expanded police powers; 6) Procedures for administrative detention;
and 7) The imposition of heightened penalties for terrorism-related offenses.

Vol. 6:4]

Dark Law

663

a result, officials have read counterterrorism laws to prohibit a range of
activities—from blocking traffic during public demonstrations to posting
information about political protests on social media. Similarly,
counterterrorism laws in at least forty states ban acts that cause “public
disruptions,” but again few laws define with any specificity those acts which
meet the legal threshold for a public disruption. Legislative provisions in at
least thirty-six countries exclude any requirement that acts of terrorism cause
terror or fear, which jettisons the conceptual distinction between terrorism
and other forms of violence. 107 Such ill-defined definitions of terrorism lend
themselves to expansive interpretations by state authorities. 108 Ten countries
have even enacted counterterrorism laws that lack any definition of terrorism.
Table 1: Differences in Legal Definitions of Terrorism After 9/11, (N=142)109

Define terrorism
Include harm
to property
Include harm
to public order
Prohibits
public disruptions
References ideological
motivations
Reference fear
or terror
Exempts national
liberation movements
Exempts dissent or
political advocacy

107

Number of
Countries
132
79
88
40
39
108
2

15

No terrorism definition
Do not include harm to
property
Do not include harm to
public order
Does not prohibit
public disruptions
No references to
ideological motivations
Does not reference fear
or terror
Does not exempt
national liberation
movements
Does not exempt
dissent or political
advocacy

Number of
Countries
10
63
54
102
103
36
140

127

See Jeff Goodwin, What Must We Explain to Explain Terrorism?, 3 SOC. MOVEMENT
STUD. 259, 259 (2004) (reviewing JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD: WHY
RELIGIOUS MILITANTS KILL (2003)) (“Terrorism . . . is but one type of political violence.”).
108
See, e.g., Noah Bialostozky, The Misuse of Terrorism Prosecution in Chile: The Need for
Discrete Consideration of Minority and Indigenous Group Treatment in Rule of Law
Analyses, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 81, 81 (2007) (“Despite significant progress in its
transition to democracy, the prosecution of Mapuche under the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(‘Terrorism Act’), for acts not internationally considered to be terrorism, has caused
significant erosion of rule of law principles in Chile.”).
109
Counts based on coded cross-sectional data on counterterrorism laws worldwide in 2009.
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Hong Kong’s new security law offers a recent example of statutory
vagueness in national security legislation. 110 The law, which was enacted
before it was made public, criminalizes a broad range of ill-defined conduct,
including breaking away from the country (secession), undermining the
power or authority of the central government (subversion), using violence or
intimidation against people (terrorism), and colluding with foreign or external
forces.111 Under the law, communist party officials in Beijing have authority to
interpret the scope of the law and oversee a special national security commission
to monitor its enforcement. Trials may be heard behind closed doors and people
suspected of violating provisions of the law can be wiretapped and surveilled.
Even damage to public transit may be deemed an act of terrorism and punished
by life in prison under the legislation. Defendants can be forced to stand trial and
be sentenced in mainland Chinese courts. The legislation also authorizes
prosecution of nonresidents of Hong Kong, including foreigners who support
democracy and independence for Hong Kong.
Hong Kong police have arrested dozens of people under the new
national security law, including pro-democracy media magnate Jimmy Lai.112
“In one swoop, the authorities rounded up not only some of the most aggressive
critics of the Hong Kong government but also little-known figures who had
campaigned on far less political issues,” reported journalists at the New York
Times.113 The new law has effectively silenced pro-democracy advocates and
barred pro-democracy candidates from seeking elected office.114
Hong Kong’s national security law evidences the danger posed by
indefinite statutory language. Vagueness in national security law provides
legalistic autocrats opportunities to sidestep limits on their authority. Absent
Javier C. Hernández, Harsh Penalties, Vaguely Defined Crimes: Hong Kong’s Security
Law Explained, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/world/
asia/hong-kong-security-law-explain.html [https://perma.cc/TH2C-SF6P].
111
English Translation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National
Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, XINHUANET (July 1, 2020, 12:50
AM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/01/c_139178753.htm [https://perma.cc/AC
W9-4TKL].
112
Austin Ramzy & Tiffany May, Hong Kong Arrests Jimmy Lai, Media Mogul, Under
National Security Law, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/
world/asia/hong-kong-arrests-lai-national-security-law.html [https://perma.cc/6JR2-HGYX].
113
Vivian Wang, Austin Ramzy & Tiffany May, With Mass Arrests, Beijing Exerts an
Increasingly Heavy Hand in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/01/06/world/asia/china-hong-kong-arrests.html [https://perma.cc/K7M7-6SMV].
114
See Austin Ramzy, Elaine Yu & Tiffany May, Hong Kong Is Keeping Pro-Democracy
Candidates Out of Its Election, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
07/29/world/asia/hong-kong-arrests-security-law.html [https://perma.cc/FK25-WBLM] (“[T]he
city’s authorities have taken aggressive steps against the pro-democracy opposition. Officials
on Thursday barred 12 candidates, including well-known pro-democracy figures, from the
September legislative election.”).
110
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meaningful judicial review, vague definitions of national security offenses
grant leaders virtually unbridled power to selectively investigate, detain,
prosecute, and imprison disfavored groups.
B. Judicial Deference
Judicial review is an important safeguard of democratic principles and
institutions for several reasons.115 First, judges invalidate legislation that on
its face violates constitutional, international, or customary law. 116 Such
constitutional review imposes constraints on policymakers based on existing
doctrine and legal standards and also delineates the outer boundaries of
legitimate policymaking activity. Legal decisions establish a record of
judicial reasoning and legal precedent that acts as a counterweight to
overzealous lawmaking.
Second, judges strike down, clarify, or revise vague statutory
constructions that fail to articulate with specificity the kinds of conduct to be
regulated, prohibited, or punished by legislators. Lawmakers often hastily
enact laws during crises that endure long after emergencies end. 117 By
reviewing national security statutes, courts can temper or eliminate
unconstitutional effects and maintain rule of law.
Finally, judicial review gives recourse to minority interests that may
otherwise be trampled by the tyranny of the majority. Judicial review can aid
in the defense of marginalized group rights and may induce politics of
compromise and nonviolence. Judicial institutions often are more insulated
from political pressures due to pre-established periods for judicial
appointment or life tenure and, therefore, are in a stronger position to make
unpopular challenges to state power. 118
115

See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional
Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1762 n.31, 1767 n.67 (2015) (detailing the
independent judiciary’s power of judicial review of other government branches).
116
Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts:
The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 182 (2020).
117
David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times
of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2566 (2003) (“Considered over time, judicial review of
emergency and national-security measures can and has established important constraints on
the exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the scope of what is acceptable in future
emergencies.”); Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 116, at 182 (“[T]he suspension principle is
inextricably linked with the idea that a crisis is of finite—and brief—duration. To that end,
the principle is ill-suited for long-term and open-ended emergencies like the one in which
we currently find ourselves.”).
118
For a review of the judiciary’s ability to check the other branches of government, see
GEOFFREY R. STONE, WAR AND LIBERTY: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: 1790 TO THE PRESENT
(2007); Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350 (2006); Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994);
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In these ways, judicial review seeks to preserve democracy’s
structural integrity as a system of governance and maintains balance of
powers between branches of government. Independent courts help to defend
existing rights and check autocratic impulses.
However, courts sometimes are unable to restrain state power,
particularly in times of emergency. 119 David Cole, for example, identifies
four reasons judicial review of national security may falter.120 First, judges,
as government officials, are likely to identify with executive national security
interests. When judges review national security cases, they are often highly
deferential to executive policy decisions in their holdings. 121 Second, the
evaluation of national security, especially during crises and without access to
classified information, is very difficult and tends to require judges to balance
liberty interests and constitutional rights. In many instances, the mere
mention of a national security claim may trigger a distinct set of deferential
judicial dispositions. For example, “courts have declined to reach the merits of
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Unreviewable Executive: Kiyemba, Maqaleh, and the Obama
Administration, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 603 (2010).
119
See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN
THE BALANCE] (describing periods of court deference to the legislative branch in times of
emergency); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND] (tracing the rise of the strong executive as characteristic of the modern era);
Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J.
422 (2012) (illustrating judicial capacity constraints impacting judicial deference toward
political processes); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003) (illustrating the judiciary’s
deferential approach in reviewing governmental actions and decisions during states of
emergency); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in
Wartime, WIS. L. REV. 273 (2003) (exploring judicial behavior during times of crisis, when
security needs are sometimes overestimated at the expense of civil liberties).
120
Cole, supra note 117, at 2570–71.
121
See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 135 (2007) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decisions post-9/11 and
positing that “while the government’s losses in the Supreme Court made front-page news,
the decisions were really little more than slaps on the wrist” because “[c]ontrary to the
Court’s civil liberties rhetoric, it did not at that time require the President to alter many of
his actions.”); Gross, supra note 119, at 1060–61 (recounting Chief Justice Chase’s view in
Ex parte Milligan that the government’s “[p]owers expanded” and citizens’ “rights
contracted . . . in times of crisis” and that deference to the government was simply “the price
to be paid by society if it were to survive [a] crisis and retain its identity and independence”);
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 125
(2011) (illustrating the Supreme Court’s unwillingness “to engage the substance of
counterterrorism policies”); Vladeck, supra note 118, at 608 (detailing the Supreme Court’s
tacit agreement (by virtue of denying certiorari) with the Obama administration’s argument
that the matters disputed in Kiyemba II were “best left to the discretion of the political
branches in general, and to the Executive in particular”).
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almost all of the cases challenging executive policies on renditions, detainee
treatment and transfers, legal targeting, and warrantless wiretapping.122 Third,
judicial rulings against executives can create constitutional crises which
threaten the legitimacy of the judiciary. Therefore, judicial decisions have
tended to skirt substantive issues in favor of procedural critiques of legal
decision-making.123 And finally, no judge wants to be responsible for the next
attack. A judicial ruling limiting state action may result in serious costs to
national security or human life. Judges will uphold executive orders and other
policies more readily in light of these factors and deference becomes a
mainstay of national security judicial review.124
Debates on the scope of judicial review are longstanding. 125 Under
the right conditions, courts undeniably strengthen besieged constitutional
democracies by protecting vulnerable groups against political repression.126
But judicial review has limitations, particularly during times of crises. 127
When politics and national security threats depart from ordinary judicial
review, scholars have documented pronounced judicial deference to state
authorities.128 Judicial deference may be appropriate at times. Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule, for example, have argued that in times of emergency the
122

Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 829 (2013).
123
Id. at 866, 896.
124
See id. at 855 (“Where the executive generally receives a broad degree of deference,
courts will be willing to uphold a wider range of executive policy choices.”).
125
See generally Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986) (undergoing an examination of “court efforts to control agency
action and the basic principles of law that govern judicial review of agency action”);
Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling
Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1
(2000) (providing a detailed explanation of “an overlooked tension between judicial
deference to administrative agencies under modern administrative law and the judiciary’s
original, influential role in our constitutional design”).
126
Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1454 (2007)
(“Independent judicial review takes on particular significance in parliamentary systems.
There is an ever-present risk in democratic systems that the claimed exigencies necessitating
the use of emergency powers, including the power to suppress antagonistic political speech,
will become the rule that swallows the exception.”).
127
POSNER & VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 119, at 33–34.
128
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1366–85
(2009); Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA.
L. REV. 765, 776–86 (2016); see, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 329 (1936) (“We deem it unnecessary to consider . . . the several clauses which are said
to evidence the unconstitutionality of the Joint Resolution as involving an unlawful
delegation of legislative power. It is enough to summarize by saying that, both upon principle
and in accordance with precedent, we conclude there is sufficient warrant for the broad
discretion vested in the President to determine whether the enforcement of the statute will
have a beneficial effect upon the re-establishment of peace in the affected countries . . . .”).
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executive's ability to act swiftly and decisively is both a normative good and
a political inevitability.129 Other arguments in favor of judicial deference in
national security cases involve claims to executive privilege, state secrecy, or
judicial abstention from political questions.
Legal black holes and legal grey holes pose yet other problems for
judicial review. 130 Black holes are lawless voids carved out through
legislation usually during states of emergency. In a legal black hole, law is
totally suspended. Perhaps the most notorious example is the detention of
enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where United States
government officials held detainees in the war on terror and claimed to
operate beyond any legal jurisdiction. Such legal voids permit authorities to
operate without legal restriction. Along similar lines, legal grey holes are
situations where legal restraints exist but judicial review remains too weak to
stay state actions.131 Grey holes rely on judicial abdication or cursory judicial
review to expand enforcement discretion where law would otherwise govern
executive action.132 In both instances, robust judicial review may be required
to reestablish substantive constitutional rights.133
Judicial review also falters where judges refuse to scrutinize evidence
of mismatch between state motivations and legal justifications. This problem
was on display in Trump v. Hawaii. 134 There, the United States Supreme
Court applied only rational basis review to decide the legality of the Trump
administration’s travel bans restricting immigration to the United States by

129

POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 119, at 13–15. See generally
Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009)
(arguing that administrative law inevitably includes legal black and grey holes).
130
DYZENHAUS, supra note 21, at 2–3.
131
Id.
132
David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal
Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005, 2018 (2006) (“A grey hole is a legal space in which
there are some legal constraints on executive action—it is not a lawless void—but the
constraints are so insubstantial that they pretty well permit government to do as it pleases.”).
133
Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains: Changing
Individual Rights Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1029, 1033 (2015) (“National security is becoming less an exceptional zone of limited or
nonexistent legal protection and instead more like the domestic sphere where robust judicial
review provides significant protections from government overreaching.”).
134
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2402 (2018) (“Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence may be considered, but the
policy will be upheld so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii:
How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 641, 650 (2019) (“[C]onstitutional protections can be put on hold if the government
asserts a remotely plausible claim of military necessity, and the ugly real motivations for a
government policy can be swept under the rug.”).
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citizens of eight countries. 135 The Court refused to evaluate whether the
action arose from unconstitutional motives on the part of the administrative
officials because of executive claims that the case involved national
security. 136 Although all nine justices expressed misgivings about the
administration’s purported policy rationales, a majority nonetheless deferred
to the President and cast aside any constitutional considerations of welldocumented racial and religious animus. They upheld the travel bans because
it was not impossible to find a relationship between the bans and legitimate
state interests. 137 Due to the administration’s national security claims, the
Court’s majority doubled down on deference to executive power, even when
the travel bans, if reviewed, might have been found to violate constitutional
law. Justice Kennedy penned a concurrence in which he argued that “the very
fact that an official may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial
scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative for him or her to adhere to the
Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.” 138 Justice Kennedy, in his
farewell opinion before leaving the Court, defended the promise of
constitutional principles and at the same time refused to consider wellfounded allegations of unconstitutionality. 139 Federal courts are not alone in
showing such extreme deference in judicial review of national security. 140
Deference to considered professional judgments has long formed the
backbone of national security review.141 Judges, who often lack bureaucratic
support, resources, information, and experience in national security, are
understandably reluctant to second-guess state authorities with greater access
to real-time intelligence on security threats. But such deference often is
premised on beliefs in well-reasoned and evidence-based decision-making.142
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2420 (deciding that, under rational basis review, the Court “will
uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds”).
136
Id. at 2421.
137
Id. at 2402 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“On the few occasions
where the Court has struck down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny, a
common thread has been that the laws at issue were ‘divorced from any factual context from
which [the Court] could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests.’”).
138
Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139
See id. (arguing that “officials are [not] free to disregard the Constitution and the rights
it proclaims and protects” even when their actions are not subject to judicial review).
140
See, e.g., Heath, supra note 67, at 1066 (“[O]utside of a small set of patently abusive
security measures, the new national security hinders the ability of tribunals to exercise
meaningful review while also maintaining a high degree of deference.”)
141
See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (giving “great deference to
the professional judgment of military authorities”); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (quoting Goldman 475 U.S. at 507 for the same proposition).
142
See Shirin Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 991, 995 (2018)(“In the Trump era, the President's open animus towards racial
135
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Courts stand down to democratically elected state authorities, at least in part,
because judges presume state leaders are seeking to make decisions in the
public interest.143 Where these presumptions come into question, particularly
in regimes flirting with autocratic rule, is when overly deferential courts
effectively transform statutory vagueness in national security legislation into
state power.144
Bureaucratic norms, internal opposition from career civil servants,
and administrative investigations also constrain autocratic power, even
absent juridical review. 145 However, courts are presumed to be sentinels of
and religious minority groups and erratic decision-making will lead some judges, especially in
the lower courts, to question executive national security claims more readily than in the past.
Yet in cases where judges do not feel able to resolve disputes on the public record, concerns
over the disclosure or management of national security information will persist.”).
143
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008) (“Because our Nation’s past
military conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer
boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous
threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this luxury. This result is not
inevitable, however. The political branches, consistent with their independent obligations to
interpret and uphold the Constitution, can engage in a genuine debate about how best to
preserve constitutional values while protecting the Nation from terrorism.”).
144
Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1686–87 (2015)
(stating that executives may rely upon [1] judicial review as a means of consolidating power;
[2] defamation law to induce self-censorship; [3] electoral laws as a means of
disenfranchisement; [4] non-political crimes against political opponents; [5] internationallybacked institutions against dissidents; and [6] the abuse of democratic and rule-of-law
rhetoric); David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 213 (2013)
(“[C]onstitutional change can be used to either dismantle or pack institutions serving as
strongholds for the opposition. The weakening or removal of opposition figures is
instrumental to the construction of competitive authoritarian regimes because it gives
incumbents a greatly increased power to rework the state to their advantage.”); Ginsburg,
Huq & Versteeg, supra note 56, at 241 (“Across a range of different geopolitical contexts,
an increasing number of countries can appropriately be characterized as ‘hybrid’
democracies, such as competitive authoritarian regimes and ‘democratorship[s].’”).
145
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317–19 (2006) (arguing that
bureaucracy is one important aspect of separation of powers); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting
Rights from Within?: Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1027, 1029–30 (2013) (“[L]egal scholars also point to executive oversight institutions as
necessary to mitigate inadequate judicial review of state national security activities. . . .
Congress created [Inspectors General], which now exist in over fifty federal agencies, for the
explicit purpose of monitoring agencies.”); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws:
Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2007) (“This
Article . . . seeks to elevate an essential source of constraint that often is underappreciated
and underestimated: legal advisors within the executive branch.”); Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The
Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 677 (2005)
(“The institutional literature typically projects confidence that the [Solicitor General] and
[Office of Legal Counsel] . . . scrupulously protect the Constitution against executive officials
distorting the law to advance personal, partisan, or institutionally parochial agendas.”).
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the rule of law in liberal democracies and serve as bulwarks to safeguard
citizens’ rights and freedoms against state encroachment. Judges relinquish
this role in national security cases in an effort to protect the public. 146
However, in the present era, where national security legislation often
decouples from evidence-based assessments of violence, judges should not
always presume that democratically elected leaders will act in good faith or
for the public good. Judicial officials have a greater responsibility for
thorough judicial review, particularly in countries with legalistic autocrats.
C. Legalistic Autocrats
There has been a resurgence of autocratic leadership amid the current
democratic recession.147 Many autocrats are using law as a means to legitimate
their actions and authority. Legalistic autocrats have eroded democratic norms
and cowed political opponents in a growing number of states.148
This rise of legalistic autocrats who rely on national security laws to
obscure unlawful practices reflects previous democratic gains. After the Cold
War, ideas about human rights and democracy diffused around the globe.149
The proliferation of liberal values raised costs for political leaders who openly
engaged in direct forms of political repression. Bilateral and multilateral
sanctions regimes, for example, began to monitor democratic progress and
punish heads of state who exercised extra-legal authority.150 As a result, wouldbe autocrats in weak democratic states had to search for more legitimate means
to consolidate political authority. 151 It became harder to suppress political
opposition with outright reliance on brute force or state violence.152
National security lawmaking emerged as a salient resource for
autocrats seeking political cover. According to Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg,
“hybrid regimes” have become more common in recent decades. 153
146

See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010) (providing that
“respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate” because “national security and
foreign policy concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an
area where information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult
to assess.”).
147
Diamond, supra note 47, at 151–52.
148
Attila Ágh, for example, has traced Hungary’s democratic backsliding in recent decades.
Attila Ágh, Decline of Democracy in East-Central Europe: The Last Decade as the Lost
Decade in Democratization, 7 J. COMP. POL. 4 (2014).
149
John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society
and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOCIO. 144, 174 (1997).
150
David Landau, Political Support and Structural Constitutional Law, 67 ALA. L. REV.
1069, 1093 (2016).
151
Scheppele, supra note 15, 188–233.
152
Kim Lane Scheppele, Not Your Father’s Authoritarianism: The Creation of the
“Frankenstate,” EUR. POL. & SOC’Y (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, Wash., D.C.), Winter 2013, at 5–7.
153
Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 94–95.
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Democratic declines, they argue, have followed two distinct paths:
authoritarian reversion and constitutional retrogression.154 Huq and Ginsburg
predict that the likelihood of authoritarian reversion—the near total collapse of
democratic institutions and norms—presents less of a threat to democracies
than the risk of constitutional retrogression—the incremental erosion of fair
elections, political speech, and law.155 If this is correct, national security law
presents opportunities for legalistic autocrats to legitimate undemocratic state
power and expand state enforcement authority.156
This deepening global crisis of governance increases the danger that
heads of state will misuse national security law. Increased enforcement of
counterterrorism laws worldwide illustrates this risk and its relationship with
democracy. In less than a decade, law enforcement agencies arrested nearly
120,000 individuals for terrorism-related offenses worldwide. 157 Nearly one
out of three of these arrests resulted in a conviction, more than 35,000
worldwide. 158 However, counterterrorism enforcement was remarkably
uneven across nations.159

154

Id. at 92.
Id. at 168.
156
See Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 281, 283 (2014) (“Law and courts are frequently deployed to (a) exercise state power
vis-à-vis opposition, (b) advance administrative discipline within state institutions, (c)
maintain cohesion among various factions within the ruling coalition, (d) facilitate market
transitions, (e) contain majoritarian institutions through authoritarian enclaves, (f) delegate
controversial reforms, and (g) bolster regime legitimacy.”).
157
Martha Mendoza, Christopher Torchia, Christopher Bodeen, Paul Schemm & Ciaran
Giles, AP Analysis: 35,000 Worldwide Convicted as Terrorists Since 9/11, MERCURY NEWS
(Aug. 13, 2016, 1:36 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2011/09/05/ap-analysis-35000worldwide-convicted-as-terrorists-since-911/ [https://perma.cc/JAR2-DGPL].
158
Id.
159
Id.
155
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Graph 1: Cumulative Arrests and Convictions Under Counterterrorism
Laws Worldwide, 2001–2010 (AP).
100000
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0

Cumulative Anti-Terror Arrests

Cumulative Anti-terror Convictions

Data collected by Associated Press (AP) in 2011 shows that
counterterrorism arrests and convictions increased in the decade after 9/11. 160
However, annual fluctuations suggest an irregular pattern of counterterrorism
practice worldwide. During 2001–2003, the number of arrests hovered
between 2,500 and 3,000 arrests per year worldwide. This figure more than
doubled in 2004, to over 6,000 arrests. After a slight decline in 2005, the
numbers climb again to more than 7,300 arrests in 2006. In 2007 and 2008,
there is another increase to over 11,000 and 17,000 arrests, respectively. The
trend continues into 2009, when countries in the sample reported more than
26,000 arrests. The numbers of arrests, however, vary widely by country.

160

Id. The Associated Press team coordinated freedom-of-information act requests in 105
countries with freedom-of-information laws and obtained data for 64 countries. Id. For
information on sources of data analyzed in this Part, see infra methods app. A.
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Graph 2: Cumulative Number of Counterterrorism Arrests, 2001–2011
(AP)
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Three countries—Nepal, Pakistan, and Turkey—reported more than
85,000 arrests. Eight additional countries reported more than 1,000 arrests
during this same period and eight more reported between 100 and 1,000
arrests. The remaining states reported fewer than 100 arrests on terrorismrelated charges. Notably, more than a quarter of the countries did not report
a single arrest. 161 Pervasive statutory vagueness in counterterrorism law
provided opportunities for abuse to many state leaders, but data shows
enforcement agencies in a select group of weak democratic or autocratic
countries were disproportionately responsible for the vast number of arrests
and convictions under these laws.

161

18 countries (N=64) reported no arrests under their anti-terrorism laws during this period.
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Table 2: Cumulative Number of Counterterrorism Arrests and
Convictions by Country, 2001–2010, (AP)

Country
Turkey
Pakistan
Nepal
Israel
**China
Bangladesh
United States
Ireland
Morocco
France
Spain
Indonesia
United Kingdom
Italy
Colombia
India
Azerbaijan
Macedonia
Chile
Mexico
Germany
Uganda
Belgium
Netherlands
Montenegro
Australia
Portugal
Denmark
Georgia
Greece
Kyrgyzstan
Austria
Romania
Hungary

Arrests
37242
29050
18934
7971
7649
3466
2934
2264
2000
1687
1594
765
660
632
493
485
199
175
108
86
77
75
70
67
45
35
35
27
23
23
23
22
19
17

Country
Turkey
**China
Bangladesh
*Pakistan
United States
Tunisia
Peru
Spain
Indonesia
Italy
Ireland
India
France
Azerbaijan
United Kingdom
Thailand
Germany
Belgium
Montenegro
Netherlands
Mexico
Ukraine
Australia
Denmark
Macedonia
South Africa
Hungary
Canada
Greece
Serbia
Chile
Uganda
Costa Rica
Sweden

Convictions
12897
7776
3466
2905
2568
1123
864
839
684
460
357
209
187
175
126
56
52
39
35
35
29
27
26
25
19
18
14
13
13
12
10
10
9
9
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New Zealand
17
Lithuania
8
Serbia
14
Georgia
7
Guatemala
13
Portugal
7
Norway
13
Finland
3
Sweden
12
Austria
2
Slovakia
7
Argentina
1
Bulgaria
5
Croatia
1
Cyprus
3
Guatemala
1
Poland
3
Afghanistan
0
Slovenia
3
Albania
0
Argentina
1
Algeria
0
Lithuania
1
Andorra
0
Armenia
0
Angola
0
* The number of convictions for Pakistan was calculated based on a reported
ten percent conviction rate for the total number of individuals arrested.
** The reported number of arrests in China is lower than the reported number
of convictions in China, which suggests some error or misrepresentation in
the data.
Further, more than half of all convictions for terrorism-related
offenses occurred in just two countries, Turkey and China. The top six
enforcement regimes also account for nearly ninety percent of the total
number of convictions. 162 To put that in perspective, the total number of
convictions in Turkey and China was more than four times the combined
number of counterterrorism convictions in all reporting countries ranked
below sixth.163 These stark differences illustrate how autocrats increasingly
rely on national security laws.
Disparities in the number of arrests and convictions also suggest the
importance of country-level factors in the enforcement of national security
law. Relationships between lawmaking, courts, and politics matter a great
deal to whether regimes use national security law to investigate, detain, and
punish suspects. Statistical correlations between enforcement data and
various country-level indicators underscore significant relationships between
national security laws, judicial review, and politics.
For example, country-level data suggests that democratic norms and
institutions lessen national security enforcement. Statistical regression
models show relationships between counterterrorism practices and other
country-level measures of terrorism, democracy, development, rule of law,

162

Six countries account for 30,735 of the 35,117 reported convictions worldwide.
There were 4,382 convictions under counterterrorism laws excluding the top six
countries. Turkey and China accounted for 20,673 convictions.
163
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and organizational associations.164 Controlling for region and population, the
model below reveals a significant statistical relationship between
counterterrorism arrests and two variables: 1) the number of fatal incidents of
terrorism and 2) the level of democracy.165 The correlation between arrests and
previous fatal attacks in a country suggests that while counterterrorism
lawmaking has decoupled from evidence-based assessments of political
violence in many countries, terrorism continues to impact domestic
counterterrorism enforcement. Not surprisingly, countries with more incidents
of terrorism arrest more people on terrorism-related offenses than countries
with fewer terrorist attacks. However, the model finds no correlation between
fatal acts of terrorism and terrorism convictions. The use of administrative
detention to hold suspects without charges or otherwise deny suspects judicial
process could explain this lower rate for terrorism convictions.

164

For a detailed description of the independent variables, see infra, methods app. A. The
country-level variables were compiled from a number of well-known sources, including the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), the Union of
International Associations (UIA), the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD).
165
The threshold for statistical significance is a p-value below .05.
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Table 3: Regression of Counterterrorism Arrests and Convictions, 2001–
2010, (AP Data).
VARIABLES
Region (UNDP)

Arrests
54.1
(430)
Fatal Incidents of Terrorism 3.30*
(GTD)
(1.33)
Democracy Index (EIU)
-3,600*
(1,386)
Human Development Index -11,639
(UNDP)
(14,933)
Rule of Law Estimate (WB)
3,820
(2,670)
NGOs (UIA)
0.45
(0.89)
IGOs (UIA)
1.23
(7.15)
Population (UNDP)
-0.0056
(0.0047)
Constant
30,655*
(12,986)
Observations
46
R-squared
0.333
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Convictions
-1.54
(116)
0.37
(0.48)
-1,002*
(387)
1,022
(5,262)
614
(771)
-0.021
(0.33)
1.41
(2.62)
0.0019
(0.0016)
5,594
(4,495)
41
0.326

Democratic states are also significantly less likely to arrest and
convict suspects, even after controlling for region, population, level of
development, rule of law, and associational ties to global society.
Counterterrorism enforcement decreases as measures of democracy increase.
Controlling again for region and population, the regression model probes the
statistical relationships between democracy and counterterrorism arrests and
convictions using the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index,
which comprises data on five spheres of state activity: civil liberties, electoral
process and pluralism, government functions, political participation, and
political culture.
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Table 4: OLS Regression of Anti-terrorism Arrests and Convictions,
2001–2010 (AP).
VARIABLES
Region (UNDP)
Fatal Incidents of Terrorism (GTD)
Civil Liberties (EIU)
Electoral Process and Pluralism (EIU)
Functioning of Government (EIU)
Political Participation (EIU)
Democratic Political Culture (EIU)
Human Development Index (UNDP)
Rule of Law Estimate (WB)
NGOs (UIA)
IGOs (UIA)
Population (UNDP)
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Arrests
295
(435)
2.56*
(1.25)
-3,972***
(1,070)
605
(1,007)
1,654
(1,007)
-236
(947)
-620
(1,274)
-16,786
(16,624)
1,128
(2,990)
0.28
(0.87)
2.97
(6.48)
-0.0097*
(0.0043)
30,403
(16,340)
46
0.555

Convictions
-4.64
(103)
0.28
(0.36)
-2,298***
(381)
736*
(300)
450
(298)
535
(284)
-935*
(423)
-2,424
(4,534)
1,085
(711)
0.19
(0.25)
0.40
(1.91)
-0.000098
(0.0013)
13,576**
(4,144)
41
0.710
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The model shows that a country’s rating on the Civil Liberty Index (CLI)
correlates with state officials’ propensity to enforce counterterrorism laws. 166
Authorities in less democratic states appear more likely to enforce
counterterrorism laws even after controlling for histories of violence. The
result underscores the politics at play in national security enforcement. The
Democratic Political Culture Index and the Electoral Process and Pluralism
Index also correlate with terrorism convictions, lending support to the idea
that societies with more autocratic leadership or limited electoral
participation are more likely to adopt aggressive counterterrorism
enforcement practices.
The statistical models provide evidence of greater national security
enforcement in less democratic regimes and suggest national security laws
cloak repressive tactics in more autocratic states. National studies of
counterterrorism enforcement lend support to this conclusion. 167 Legalistic
autocrats appear to exploit vague national security laws, particularly in
countries with weak democratic norms and institutions, to expand state
policing and consolidate their authority.
CONCLUSION
Relying on new empirical data, this Article advances a relational
approach to the study of national security lawmaking and develops the
concept of dark law. Dark law describes the convergence of statutory
vagueness, judicial deference, and autocratic politics. It is a relational process
in which legalistic autocrats use vague national security law to sidestep
restraints on their power. In recent decades, policymakers worldwide have
enacted vague national security statutes. National security lawmaking in
some countries has also decoupled from considerations of violence and
reasoned assessments of security threats. Meanwhile, judicial authorities
customarily defer to legalistic autocrats’ interpretations of national security
provisions. Dark law emerges from this coalescence of autocratic politics,
statutory vagueness, and judicial deference. It represents a shadowy threat to
democracy by making it difficult for the public to see autocratic maneuvers
that consolidate their hold on state power. 168
166

The Civil Liberty Index assigns countries a rating based on independent survey and World
Value Survey data intended to evaluate the existence of a free press, an independent
judiciary, voluntary associations, religious tolerance, equality under the law, basic security
of persons and property, and the use of torture by the state.
167
See generally ANDREW NEAL, EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE POLITICS OF COUNTERTERRORISM: LIBERTY, SECURITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2009) (describing the
justification of the use of illiberal practices in the name of post-9/11 national security).
168
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Democracies die
behind closed doors.”)
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Dark law is most common in weak democratic states, though it may
also be used by state leaders in hybrid or authoritarian regimes. Strong
democratic institutions and robust judicial review make a state less vulnerable
to dark law. However, courts harbor the power to help stabilize democratic
institutions only if they are willing to exercise it. Regrettably, in the absence
of democratic and judicial counterweights, legalistic autocrats use law to
maintain social control and to enhance regime legitimacy. 169 Legal observers
should be aware of the threat posed by legalistic autocrats and stand against
efforts to use national security laws to escape judicial oversight and
democratic accountability. Otherwise, legalistic autocrats can selectively
investigate, detain, prosecute, and imprison disfavored groups under the guise
of combating ill-defined national security threats.
METHODS APPENDIX
Relational legal analysis typically requires empirical investigation.
However, national security agencies are not known for transparency. Valuable
data may be classified, redacted, or destroyed by security officials. Legal
provisions are frequently amended or revised and finding reliable translations
can prove difficult. These environmental and linguistic challenges create a near
perfect storm to navigate as an empirical legal scholar. This research sought to
overcome these obstacles by triangulating national security data from different
sources. Specifically, the data derives from four datasets: 1) an archive of
national counterterrorism laws at Human Rights Watch; 2) content coding of
national counterterrorism laws; 3) counterterrorism enforcement data on
arrests and convictions under counterterrorism laws from 2001 to 2010; and 4)
country-level indicators compiled from the Global Terrorism Database, the
World Bank, the United Nations, Economist Intelligence Unit, and the Union
of International Organizations. The data focuses on counterterrorism laws as
an uncontroversial subset of national security law with well-documented
implications for state power.
A. Archival Data
The data collection includes an archive of counterterrorism laws
worldwide, compiled in collaboration with attorneys at the Program on
Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Human Rights Watch (HRW). 170 This
169

Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in
Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 21 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
170
In the Name of Security: Counterterrorism Laws Worldwide Since September 11, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/06/29/namesecurity/counterterrorism-laws-worldwide-september-11 [https://perma.cc/CNW2-7PFX].

682

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[April 2021

data included 193 UN-recognized countries. For each country, the author
reviewed all documents in the country file at HRW and cross-referenced
these documents with legislation, documents, reports, or other texts obtained
from six independent data sources:
1. The United Nations Office on Drug Control (UNODC) legislation
database;
2. The Legislationline Database;
3. The Interpol Terrorism Database;
4. The CODEXTER country profiles;
5. The Foreign Law Guide Database; and
6. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN CTC)
country reports.
The completed archive undercounts the total number of laws
worldwide. Many states do not report immigration and financial statutes
bearing on counterterrorism practices to the UN CTC or make them available
in legislative databases.
B. Content Coding
In order to assess the substantive content of the counterterrorism laws,
the author coded the texts of the archived counterterrorism laws with a focus
on seven categories. Countries were the primary unit of analysis for the
content coding.
1. Definitions of terrorism;
2. Definitions of terrorist organizations;
3. Prohibitions on material support for terrorism;
4. Limitations on speech that incites, legitimates, or lends support to
terrorism;
5. Expanded police powers;
6. Procedures for administrative detention;
7. The imposition of heightened penalties for terrorism-related offenses.
For each category, the author created a series of dichotomous
variables to provide accurate counts of the substantive features of the laws
and allow for statistical analysis. When the archive contained multiple laws
for a single country, the author used the most recent counterterrorism statute
or legal code for the content analysis. If the most recent statute or legal code
did not contain any information on a given variable, the author reviewed the
previous statute or legal code and used those standards in the coding with the
assumption that the previous legal standard would be applied in practice. If
no previous legal standard existed, the variable was left blank. The content
coding represents cross-sectional data for the year 2009. All regression
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models reflect this 2009 coding of state counterterrorism laws worldwide.
Dichotomous variables measured the presence or the absence of
legislative activity with regard to terrorism before and after the 9/11 attacks.
The first variable indicated whether a state enacted any counterterrorism laws
before 9/11. The second variable indicated whether a state enacted any
counterterrorism laws after 9/11. Drawing on documents from the
counterterrorism archive, the author coded variables based on reforms to
criminal codes or the enactment of terrorism statutes. The UN Committee on
Counter-Terrorism encouraged all states to report any counterterrorism
actions in country reports. The variables, therefore, captured most
counterterrorism laws enacted worldwide, particularly in the post-9/11
period. To assess lawmaking activity, the author also built ordinal variables
to capture the number of counterterrorism measures enacted before 9/11 and
after 9/11. If documents from the counterterrorism archive showed that a
country enacted two new counterterrorism laws before 9/11, the pre-9/11
ordinal variable would be coded “2.” Likewise, if a country reported three
new counterterrorism laws after 9/11, the corresponding variable would be
coded “3.” These ordinal variables were broad measures of counterterrorism
activity before 9/11 and after 9/11.
Translation problems sometimes complicated coding. UN CTC
reports provided English translations which proved useful for substantive
coding of post-9/11 laws. 171 The reports, however, rarely provided
translations of previous laws that had been amended, repealed, or
substantially reformed. The difficulty of finding translations of previous laws
prevented the construction of a longitudinal dataset.
Counterterrorism laws changed constantly during data collection and
analysis. Some of the laws used in the analysis have since been amended or
invalidated. The data, therefore, should not be used as a current rendering of
counterterrorism law. The work sacrifices some national precision in order to
capture global shifts in counterterrorism lawmaking.
C. Arrests and Convictions Data
Gathering reliable data on counterterrorism enforcement is even more
challenging than gathering translations of national laws, particularly in
countries where information on criminal detentions and prosecutions is not
public. For the analysis, the author relied on data collected by a team of 140
Associated Press (AP) journalists in 2011. The journalists collected
information on counterterrorism arrests and convictions in sixty-four
countries between 2001 and 2011. The AP team requested data on
171

The UN CTC country reports were not available before October of 2001, when the United
Nations created the Counter-Terrorism Committee.
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counterterrorism enforcement in 105 countries with freedom-of-information
laws. Journalists working in-country and generally fluent in the national
language vetted the data. Collectively, the AP obtained arrest and conviction
numbers from 2001–2011. Although reporting countries represented a
minority of states worldwide, these countries included more than threequarters of the global population.
D. Country-Level Data
The author merged the content coding with country level indicators
from a number of sources, including the Global Terrorism Database, the
World Bank, the United Nations, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and the
Union of International Organizations. Below is a brief description of these
country-level variables.
1. Dependent variables
Counterterrorism Content Codes: Substantive features of the laws
were coded as dichotomous variables. These variables were organized around
seven substantive categories.
Counterterrorism Measures Before 9/11: A dichotomous variable and
an ordinal variable captured the number of counterterrorism measures enacted
in each country prior to 9/11. In some models, these were control variables.
Counterterrorism Measures After 9/11: A dichotomous variable and an
ordinal variable captured the number of counterterrorism measures enacted in
each country after to 9/11. In some models, these were control variables.
2. Independent variables
History of Terrorism: Data from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) was used as a measure for history of terrorism. GTD included
information on more than 82,000 domestic and international terrorist attacks
between 1970 and 2007. 172 The GTD database identified terrorism incidents
from wire services, foreign broadcast services, U.S. State Department reports,
US and foreign newspaper reports, and information generated by staff. GTD
defined terrorism as events involving “the threatened or actual use of illegal
force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal
through fear, coercion or intimidation.” 173 Because the author used cross172

See Global Terrorism Database, supra note 81.
See GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, CODEBOOK: INCLUSION C RITERIA AND VARIABLES
10 (2019), https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GLG6-7KXW].
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Vol. 6:4]

Dark Law

685

sectional data on the content of the laws, the author collapsed the years of the
GTD database, creating a cumulative count for each individual country across
the years 1970–2010. This count acted as an estimate of the domestic impact
of terrorism in a country. For the purposes of this general measure, all terrorist
incidents in the GTD were treated as equivalent events. For example, three
independent bombings of an oil pipeline in Sudan that caused no fatalities
would be counted the same as three car bombings in Iraq resulting in two dozen
fatalities. To account for differences in the character of terrorism events, the
author also created independent measures for terrorist incidents which caused
more than one casualty and for terrorist incidents which caused more than
fifteen casualties. The author used these measures of fatal terrorist incidents as
a means to adjust for the increased rhetorical use of terrorism after 9/11.
Economic Development: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
and the Human Development Index were used as measures of development.
The author reported GDP from 2009 in constant 2005 dollars. The author also
used the 2009 Human Development Index rating for each country. 174 The two
separate measures yielded similar results in regression models.
Rule of Law: The author included the World Bank Rule of Law
Estimate (2009) as a way to capture public confidence in rule of law. The
variable accounted for the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
policing, and access to the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and
violence. The rule of law estimate was included in statistical models as a
control measure.
Population: The author included the Human Development Reports
Population total for both sexes (thousands) (2009) as a control variable.
Education: The author included the Human Development Reports
Education Index (2009) as a control variable.
Gender: The author included the UN Gender Inequality Index (GII)
as a control variable.
Democracy: The author measured democracy using the Economist
Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (2008). The index measures the
current state of democracy worldwide for 165 independent states based on
five categories: 1) electoral process and pluralism; 2) civil liberties; 3) the
functioning of government; 4) political participation; and 5) political culture.
The index also categorizes countries within one of four types of regimes: 1)
full democracies; 2) flawed democracies; 3) hybrid regimes; and 4)
authoritarian regimes. In the analysis of counterterrorism enforcement, the

174

For more detailed technical information about the indicators, consult the websites of the
respective source agencies at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics [https://perma.cc/EQF6DQSM].
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author also broke down the index and used the measures of the individual
categories to provide a more nuanced analysis of the features of a society that
correlated with greater counterterrorism enforcement.
Influence of the World Polity: The author measured the influence of
the world polity on a given country by the number of INGOs and NGOs in a
state. Data from the Union of International Associations (2007) was used to
measure the number of organizations.
The triangulation of data from various sources and the documentation
of statutory vagueness, judicial review, and enforcement of laws by legalistic
autocrats provide insight into the relations, transactions, and processes that
shape national security in weak democracies. The data also document global
transformations of national security lawmaking.

